free web hosting | website hosting | Web Hosting | Free Website Submission | shopping cart | php hosting

Thomas B. Ginter

Sovereign Citizen

Kingdom of Heaven

Embassy of Heaven

8777 Basl Hill Road

Stayton, Oregon 

State of Heaven

10470 South Redwood Road #201

South Jordan, Utah

Sui Juris

Attorney Pro Se

                                            State of Utah - Under Martial Law__________________

 

IN THE WEST VALLEY CITY UNOFFICIAL MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT

3350 South Constitution Boulevard (2700 West)

West Valley City, Utah 84119

 (801)963-3500

 

_______________________________________________________________________

WEST VALLEY CITY, a Municipal,       DEMAND FOR PROOF OF JURISDICTION,

 Corporation,   (Unofficial)                       DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL ROTECTION       

A Racketeer Influenced Corrupt          PURSUANT TO AMENDMENTS I, IV, V, VI
Organization,18 USC 1961-1965             VII, VIII, IX, X, XIII, XIV,
AND COROLLARY

                                                                   PROVISIONS OF UTAH’S CONSTITUTION

                                       Accuser,              WITH MEMORANDUM OF LAW- BRIEF

                                                                        FREQUENT RECURRENCE TO              

                                                                       FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IS

                                                                        ESSENTIAL TO FREE GOVERNMENT

                                                           UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE I:27.
Thomas B. Ginter, Jr.                                       

Sovereign Citizen                                   West Valley City Case No. C 04 06941

State of Heaven                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                

                                                                 Judge?  Keith L. Stoney  (Unofficial Judge)

                                     Accused.                                 UCA 76-8-203 A1 and 3 ________________________________________________________________________

 

STATE OF UTAH   )

                        ) ss.

County of Salt Lake)

 

Demand for Proof of Jurisdiction and Due Process of Law .

 

The falsely Accused, Thomas B, Ginter, appearing pro se (for self) Sui Juris (capable of managing one's own affairs) in the above entitled matter, hereby challenges the jurisdiction, power and existence of this court and the entire Justice Court system under the Constitution and laws of the State of Utah and provisions stated in this paragraph, and hereby demands all of his rights, privileges and immunities granted to him from God and recognized in the Magna Carta, Mayflower Compact, Declaration of Rights of 1774 A.D., Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776 A.D., The Constitution of the United States of America, the laws made in pursuance thereof, treaties made under the authority of the United States, the Constitution of the State of Utah and laws made in pursuance thereof, common law, and that most holy, just and pure law of our Almighty Creator, Jesus Christ, the perfect law of liberty. Amen.

Demand to be Fully Informed to Insure Accused Does Not Unknowingly Waive Rights.

The Accused demands that he be fully informed throughout the proceedings at any and every time when he may be in jeopardy of waiving, without his knowledge or consent, any right, privilege or immunity protected, secured and guaranteed to Accused under any provision of the paragraph above. He demands that he be warned, sua sponte, (on its own will or motion) whenever danger of waiver becomes apparent to the duly elected or appointed and qualified magistrate exercising the functions of a public office in the above entitled court or any other court professing or claiming jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the subject matter of this proceeding, or the property of the Accused, a 1988 Toyota, of which the Accused has been deprived by force of arms by the accuser's agent Darren Mower.

The Accused demands proof of jurisdiction of:

            1.  Mower, Darren, who under the guise or disguise of a duly qualified peace officer of a political subdivision of the State of Utah issued citation #U82776428 on October 13, 2004 A.D., to the Accused, and at the time and place of issuance of the said citation did, without due process of law or equal protection of the law, deprive the Accused, Thomas B. Ginter, Jr. of his right to travel and of his right to personal property, i.e., a 1988 Model Toyota Corolla Deluxe, his sole means of transportation used in his exercise of his unfettered right to travel upon the highways of the United States of America and of the States therein, including the highways in the State of Utah..

2. Stoney, Keith L. who exercised or attempted to exercise, and continues to exercise or attempt to exercise, the functions of a public office in violation of  UCA 1953, section 76-8-203 a3, under the guise or disguise of an appointed Justice Court Judge in an arraignment hearing in this matter December 13, 2004 A.D., and continuing to this 23rd Day of February in the year of our Lord and Savior, 2005, and is aiding and abetting the upholding of the deprivations of the Accused’s unfettered right to travel and the means by which he exercises his right to travel, i.e., a. 1988 Toyota Corolla Deluxe motor vehicle, shipped in interstate commerce, and used by the Accused for personal and religious travel guaranteed, protected and secured under Amendment I , of the Constitution of the United States of America, made applicable to the States under Amendment XIV.

 3. Bunderson, Eric who is exercising or attempting to exercise the functions of a public office in the guise or disguise of a prosecuting attorney in the West Valley Justice Court for Accuser West Valley City through and by Darren Mower, thereby depriving the Accused of his right to travel  and of his right to property; the means to travel, i.e., a Toyota Corolla Deluxe being held  contrary to law without due process of law or equal protection of the laws and in violation of United States racketeering statutes, 18 USC 1961-1965, inter alia, in conspiracy with Keith L. Stoney, Darren Mower, the unofficial court clerk, West Valley City’s unofficial mayor and treasurer, David E. Yocom, who unofficially exercises the functions of public office in violation of 76-8-203, in conspiracy with Mark A. Shurtleff, Christine M. Durham, Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., Edward T. Alter, Auston G. Johnson, Olene Smith Walker, Gayle F. McKechnie, Michael O. Leavitt, Norman H. Bangerter and the whole unofficial Utah Senate and House of Representatives, none of whom have qualified to hold public office because they acted under unofficial laws and unofficial Amendments to Utah’s Constitution unofficially attempted between 1973 and  February 22, 2005 A.D.  This has been done knowingly .

  4. The person exercising or attempting to exercise the functions of a public office as a court clerk in the West Valley City's unofficial Justice Court.

  5. Any other person involved or who may become involved in the exercise or attempted exercise of a public office in these proceedings under the guise or disguise of holding any public office .including, but not limit to, any legislative, executive or judicial office of the State of Utah or any political subdivision thereof. 

Accused Demands Proof of Oath of Office Duly administered, Taken, Subscribed and Filed.

 The Accused Demands proof that each person exercising or attempting to exercise the functions of a public office in these proceedings, or in any capacity relating to or affecting these proceedings, has a valid oath of office duly filed with the public official duly qualified as the official prescribed by law for filing oaths of office;, and that each such person has been duly elected or duly appointed to such office;, and under pains and penalty of perjury, has had the required oath of office duly administered and duly subscribed by the person duly elected or duly appointed to public office, and by the person duly qualified to administer such oaths of office, showing both signatures on the oath of office..

Accused Demands Proof f Persons Administering Oaths Were Duly Oath Bound.

The Accused demands that each person who has administered the oath of office to each person participating in these proceedings was duly sworn and duly qualified to administer such oath by producing their respective oath of office certificates, duly subscribed and duly filed with the filing officer for the respective jurisdictions in which they are exercising the functions of a public office.

These demands for proving jurisdiction- in a court of competent jurisdiction over the person of the Accused; the subject matter involved-the statutes or ordinances limiting the  Accused's liberty right to travel, and his right to own and control property of which the Accused has been deprived-a 1988 Toyota Corolla Deluxe; must me met before these proceedings may go forward.

Proceeding without formal proof of jurisdiction is a denial of due process of law. The Constitutions to which we owe allegiance require that no person be denied due process of law or equal protection of the laws. States are bound  by Amendment XIV.

Justice Court System Is Not Established Pursuant To Constitutional Law.

The Justice Courts System claims authority under Article VIII Section 1 of the Utah Constitution:  [Judges of courts not of record.] Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a manner, for a term, and with qualifications provided by statute. However, no qualification may be imposed which requires judges of courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number of judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute.  [This  provision is unconstitutional and void. There have been no valid amendments to Utah's Constitution since1973 A.D.] The Justice of the peace system is official and is still in effect under the constitutional laws of the State of Utah  A justice of the peace is an elective office under Utah's Constitution, not an appointive office. 

Last revised: Tuesday, December 21, 2004

Article VIII, Section 16. [Public prosecutors.]
 The Legislature shall provide for a system of public prosecutors who shall have primary responsibility for the prosecution of criminal actions brought in the name of the State of Utah and shall perform such other duties as may be provided by statute. Public prosecutors shall be elected in a manner provided by statute, and shall be admitted to practice law in Utah. If a public prosecutor fails or refuses to prosecute, the Supreme Court shall have power to appoint a prosecutor pro tempore.  

Title 78, Chapter 5, Sections 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 113, 120, and 125, of the "unofficial" Utah Code provide for a Justice Court System.  [This provision is unconstitutional and void.  An amendment to Utah's Constitution was required to change the justice of the peace court system to a justice court system.  Whereas no person has been duly elected or appointed and qualified as a senator in the Utah Senate since 1974 A.D., there could not have been any laws enacted or constitutional amendments officially proposed so there could not have been any such amendments passed. Therefore, there has not been a valid amendment to Utah's Constitution since 1973, A.D.  I hereby challenge any, and every, person in the State of Utah to prove otherwise. 

Three letters from the State Archives prove that the oaths of office of persons elected to the Utah Senate all failed to qualify for office for the terms of office beginning in 1975 through 1990.   These letters are attached to this filing, and are made a part hereof by this reference.

 

The Accused in this matter hereby demands proof that oaths of office of senators were filed with the secretary of state in the State of Utah before persons claiming to be senators attempted to exercise the functions of the public office of senator to change the state official with whom official oaths of state officials were and are to be filed.   Furthermore the unofficial lieutenant governor's list of oaths of office in the division of archives shows no oaths of office for any person elected to the Utah senate for the terms beginning in 1975, 1976, 1977, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1987 and 1989 A.D.  Therefore it is impossible for a majority of fifteen senators to have acted on any legislation for any of those terms of office.  Therefore there could not have been an official amendment to change Article VII or VIII, relating to the office of secretary of state or to the office of justice of the peace.  Therefore, there is no justice court in West Valley City or in the State of Utah, and therefore, Citation No. U82775428, issued to the Accused, Thomas B. Ginter, a sovereign citizen, is false and fraudulent, and was used to steal his 1988 Toyota Corolla Deluxe motor vehicle, and to deprive him of his right to travel therein under his constitutional rights and blessings of Liberty secured to him by the Constitution of the United States, the Bill of Rights, and Amendments XIII and XIV. Included herein as if fully expressed or quoted.

Return of Motor Vehicle Demanded With Damages Paid in Lawful Money Included

Therefore, the falsely Accused, hereby demands the immediate return of said motor vehicle, without delay, and demands compensation for the loss of time and expenses incurred in defending against this unjust usurpation of power and the malicious prosecution of him in this unofficial case.  Damages claimed exceed 7.67 trillion dollars in gold and silver Coin of the United States, the estimated current obligation of the Federal Reserve Banks and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and William Jefferson Clinton and George W. Bush and John F. Kerry who have participated in the Racketeering enterprise with Accuser West Valley City and others named herein.  George W. Bush, George H. W. Bush, Joseph Lieberman, and Howard Dean are all members of Skull and Bones, a secret combination, the most influential secret society in America, who now control with their affiliated secret societies an excessive amount of the property acquired by criminal means in violation of !8 USC 4, 8, 334, 371, 471, 472, 473, 891-894, 1341-1343, 1961-1965, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384,2385 and 2386, among others, thereby forfeiting their rights to life, liberty and property and the pursuit of happiness.

West Valley City, the false accuser, and Darren Mower, the unofficial policeman, and Eric Bunderson, the unofficial prosecutor, and the unofficial clerk, are all liable for the damages imposed upon the Accused for the false prosecution in which the Accused was threatened with the loss of his liberty for failure to attend the unofficial court by means of an unlawful order in the form of a false citation directing the Accused to appear in an unofficial court, the unofficial West Valley City Municipal Justice Court, or be put in jail for failure to comply.  This deprivation of rights goes much further.  The incident not only caused the falsely accused in this case to be left without private means of travel, but subjected him to incurring an extortionate extension of credit in counterfeit notes or coins or credit not redeemable in gold and silver coin from Harman's Towing ,  969-4749,   2923 S 3500 W, West Valley City, Utah or Kearns Towing, 2881 South 3600 West, West Valley City, Utah 84119, phone )801) 886-9202, Detective Hold call (801) 9633293.  This is part of a racketeering scheme to defraud the Accused by attempting to make him use falsely made securities and current coins of the United States and the Federal Reserve Banks issued through the twelve Federal Reserve Banks and circulated in West Valley City, Salt Lake County, the State of Utah, and throughout the United States of America and elsewhere.  It is an international racketeering scheme that is operating without authority of law and in violation of numerous provisions thereof, and in violation of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah.

Federal Felony Statutes Attached To Demand And Brief-Memorandum of Law.

“No State shall…make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts;”

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

AND OFFICIAL NOTICE

State of Utah
Office of the Governor
Lawrence Rey Topham, Acting Governor

November 4, 2003 A.D.

OFFICIAL NOTICE

OATH OF OFFICE IS ESSENTIAL TO HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE

FAILURE TO FILE OATH OF OFFICE OR BOND
WITHIN TIME PRESCRIBED BY LAW
IS FATAL TO HOLDING PUBLIC OFFICE;
THE OFFICE AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES VACANT;
LATE FILING IS INEFFECTIVE;
EVERY UNOFFICIAL ACT IS VOID;
AND ANY SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS ARE VITIATED.

Persons chosen for public office may be required by law to accept the office within a specified time and to qualify by filing an oath, giving bond or doing whatever else the law declares necessary to entitle them to assume the duties of the office.

Applicable statutes are controlling and may declare vacancy to exist if the person chosen for the office fails to accept or qualify as required by law. Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. 137, 15 L.Ed 316.

Failure to comply with such provisions will absolutely forfeit the right to office. Brannon v. Perky, 127 W Va 103, 31 SE2d 898, 158 ALR 631.

Office is vacant by reason of failure to file a required oath. Boisvert v. County of Ontario, 395 NYS2d 617.

Failure to timely file oath of office, in accordance with a statute so requiring, neither notice nor judicial procedure is necessary; the office is automatically vacant and may be filled as provided by law. Comins v. County of Delaware, 411 NYS2d 533.

Act Declaring office vacant and to be filled as provided by law for failure to qualify within 60 days after beginning of term is not unconstitutional and applies to all officers enumerated and similarly situated. State Ex Rel. Stain v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 25 P.2d 775.

Judges of the Supreme Court subscribe to this oath when entering upon their duties as justices thereof. Critchlow v. Monson, 102 U. 378, 131 P.2d 794.

Filing an oath of office after the time prescribed by law is not a compliance with the law, confers no power to act as a public officer or in a public office and any person who fails to file his oath of office within the time limits required by law creates an ipso facto vacancy and such person's acts are void and vitiate any subsequent proceedings. Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. 137, 15 L.Ed 316.

UTAH CONSTITUTION

Utah Constitution Article IV, Section 10, Provides:

"All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution or by the laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation; "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of this State, and that I will discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.["]

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 76-8-203, Provides:

(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions of a public office when:
(a) He has not taken and filed the required oath of office; or
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has expired and the successor has been elected or appointed and has qualified, or his office has been legally removed.
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his successor in office or other person entitled to the official seal or any records, papers, documents, or other writing appertaining or belonging to his office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the same.
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor.

Title 52 Chapter 01 Official Oaths and Bonds

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 52-1-2 [renumbered but unchanged from 65-0-2]

Whenever state officers, officials or state institutions, or other persons are required to give official bonds to the state, such bonds, unless otherwise provided, shall be approved by the state board of examiners, and recorded by the secretary of state in a book kept for that purpose. When so recorded the secretary of state shall deliver the originals to the state treasurer, excepting the bond of the state treasurer, and the treasurer shall become the legal custodian thereof, but the bond of the state treasurer shall remain in the custody of the secretary of state. The oaths of office of all state officials shall be filed with the secretary of state. (C.L. 17 Sec. 4306.)

Title 52 Chapter 02 Failure to Qualify for Office

52-2-1. Time in which to qualify -- Failure -- Office declared vacant.

Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or any of its political subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that continuance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall thereupon become vacant and shall be filled as provided by law. Any elected or appointed official who has failed on the effective date of this act to qualify for the position to which he was elected or appointed, shall be deemed to come within the provisions of this act, and the office of such officer shall become vacant at the end of forty days after the effective date of this act unless legal bond is given before the expiration of such period, and such office shall be filled as provided by law.

No Change Since 1953

  ONLY FIVE PEOPLE HAVE FILED THE REQUIRED OATH OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN THE STATE OF UTAH SINCE 1984.

  NO UTAH SENATOR-ELECT HAS FILED THE REQUIRED OATH OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN UTAH SINCE 1974 A.D.

  NO UTAH LAWS OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN ENACTED OR MADE SINCE 1974 A.D., WHEN THE UTAH SENATORS-ELECT ALL FAILED TO FILE THE REQUIRED OATH OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND HAVE CONTINUED SUCH FAILURE UNTO THIS VERY DAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2003 A.D.   OLENE SMITH WALKER HAS NEVER FILED AN OATH OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE EITHER AS A LEGISLATOR OR AS AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER. ALL OF HER ACTS HAVE BEEN, AND ARE, UNOFFICIAL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.

  NEITHER THE REPUBLICAN NOR THE DEMOCRAT POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE REGISTERED WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF UTAH SINCE 1981, OR EVEN BEFORE THEN, THEY ARE UNOFFICIAL PARTIES IN UTAH, AS ARE ALL OTHER PARTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME.

 

THEREFORE, GEORGE W. BUSH IS NOT THE DULY ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF UTAH DID NOT CERTIFY ANY REPUBLICAN ELECTORS TO CONGRESS FOR THE 2000 A.D., GENERAL ELECTION. WITHOUT ANY UTAH ELECTORS IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR GEORGE W. BUSH TO BECOME PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. THE CORRUPTION IN UTAH HAS SPREAD OVER THE WHOLE NATION BRINGING THE CONSTITUTION TO THE BRINK OF RUIN AND TO THE VERY VERGE OF DESTRUCTION.

NORMAN H. BANGERTER, GORDON R. HALL, MICHAEL D. ZIMMERMAN, I. DANIEL STEWART, W. VAL OVESON, TOM L. ALLEN, EDWARD T. ALTER, R. PAUL VAN DAM, MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, OLENE S. WALKER, AUSTON G. JOHNSON, MARK A. SHURTLEFF AND ALL OF UTAH'S UNOFFICIAL LEGISLATORS FROM 1974 THROUGH NOVEMBER 4, 2003 A.D., AND DAVID E. YOCOM, E. NEAL GUNNARSON, AARON D. KENNARD AND ALL THEIR UNOFFICIAL DEPUTIES, AND ALL OF THE UNOFFICIAL JUDGES ACTING UNDER UNOFFICIAL LAWS AND UNOFFICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS HAVE ALL BUT COMPLETELY DESTROYED CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE STATE OF UTAH, AND THEY NOW INTEND TO UPHOLD THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ON WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 2003 A.D., WITH THE UNOFFICIAL INNAUGURATION OF OLENE SMITH WALKER AND HER UNOFFICIAL APPOINTEES.

IT IS MY SWORN DUTY TO WARN THE PEOPLE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES OF THIS UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDUCT BY MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, OLENE SMITH WALKER AND THEIR REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRAT ASSOCIATES WHO HAVE WORKED TO DESTROY OUR DIVINE CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND LAWS MADE PURSUANT THERETO, WHICH THEY HAVE VIOLATED FOR THE LAST TWENTY NINE (29) YEARS BY FAILING TO FILE OATHS OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND FOR THE LAST FORTY (40) YEARS, BY FINANCING THEIR UNOFFICIAL MISCONDUCT WITH COUNTERFEIT SECURITIES AND CURRENT COIN OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THIS THEY HAVE DONE WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT GORDON B. HINCKLEY, THE FIRST PRESIDENCY AND QUORUM OF TWELVE APOSTLES OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, BOTH IN THEIR PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES, BRINGING THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA INTO BONDAGE AS THE GREATEST DEBTORS IN THE WORLD, 6.861 TRILLION FALSE DOLLARS, WITH WHICH THEY FINANCE THEIR CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF EXTORTION, RACKETEERING AND REBELLION AGAINST THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF UTAH.

IT IS TREASON AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF CHURCH AND STATE AND MEDIA.

"WHEREFORE, THUS SAITH THE LORD GOD, WHO IS THE ALMIGHTY, EXCEPT YE REPENT, YE SHALL BE SMITTEN EVEN UNTO DESTRUCTION. RETURN UNTO ME AND I WILL RETURN UNTO YOU, SAITH THE LORD GOD, WHO IS THE ALMIGHTY. BUT IF YE WILL NOT REPENT, YE SHALL BE SMITTEN EVEN UNTO DESTRUCTION." AMEN. [GIVEN: AUGUST 17, 2003 A.D.]

IF THOSE EXERCISING THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICE IN THE STATE OF UTAH HAVE NOT FILED OATHS OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, OR THE COUNTY, CITY, TOWN OR OTHER OFFICERS, AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, THEY ARE NOT PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN THE STATE OF UTAH.

IF THE LEADERS AND PEOPLE IN THE STATE OF UTAH ARE NOT USING GOLD AND SILVER COIN AS LAWFUL MONEY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ONLY LAWFUL TENDER IN PAYMENT OF DEBTS, THEY ARE NOT UPHOLDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, BUT ARE, IN FACT, IN REBELLION AND THEY ARE UPHOLDING THE CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO DESTROY THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS OF ALL OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES AND POSSESSIONS THEREOF, AND HAVE LOST THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE, OWN PROPERTY, BE ON AN OFFICIAL BALLOT AND HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. ROSS C. ANDERSON AND FRANK R. PIGNANELLI ARE TWO SUCH INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE REBELLED, FAILED TO QUALIFY TO VOTE, BE ON THE OFFICIAL BALLOT AND HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE IN SALT LAKE CITY AND THE STATE OF UTAH. FRANK R. PIGNANELLI NEVER DID FILE AN OATH OF OFFICE WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE IN THE UTAH LEGISLATURE; ALL OF HIS ACTIONS THERE WERE UNOFFICIAL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID AS A MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

ALL PUBLIC ELECTIONS IN THE STATE OF UTAH SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 4, 2003 A.D., INCLUDING THE ELECTION FOR MAYOR OF SALT LAKE CITY, ARE, UNOFFICIAL, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID, WHERE THE CANDIDATES AND THE UNOFFICIAL COUNTY CLERKS AND CITY AND TOWN RECORDERS USE COUNTERFEIT SECURITIES AND CURRENT COINS OF THE UNITED STATES TO ATTEMPT TO QUALIFY FOR THE UNOFFICIAL BALLOTS AND ELECTION TO OFFICE OR TO PREPARE UNOFFICIAL BALLOTS FOR THE GENERAL MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS. THE NEWS PAPERS, RADIO AND TELEVISION STATIONS SUPPORT THE UNOFFICIAL ELECTIONS AND ARE ALSO FINANCED WITH FALSE SECURITIES AND CURRENT COIN OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THEY ARE ALL IN REBELLION AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

ONLY VOTES ON THE TRUE "OFFICIAL BALLOTS" OR "WRITE-IN VOTES" OF NON-REBELLING CITIZENS FOR NON-REBELLING CANDIDATES ARE VALID. IN SALT LAKE CITY'S GENERAL MUNICIPAL ELECTION, LAWRENCE REY TOPHAM IS THE ONLY CANDIDATE WHOSE NAME APPEARS ON THE TRUE OFFICIAL ELECTION BALLOT, THEREFORE, A SINGLE VOTE FOR HIM IS SUFFICIENT FOR VICTORY.

THIS I TESTIFY, AS A WITNESS, AND, WITH THIS ULTIMATE WARNING, WHICH I GIVE IN THE NAME OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE STATE OF UTAH, THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, AND THE CITY OF SALT LAKE, AND IN THE MOST HOLY AND SACRED NAME OF JESUS CHRIST, OUR CREATOR, OUR LORD, OUR REDEEMER, OUR BELOVED SAVIOR, OUR ELDER BROTHER AND OUR FRIEND. AMEN.

The above information was prepared by Lawrence Rey Topham, Secretary of State and acting Governor of the State of Utah, on November 3rd and 4th, 2003 A.D., AS A FORMAL PUBLIC WARNING IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA against all enemies, both foreign and domestic, WITH GOD, OUR FATHER IN HEAVEN, AND JESUS CHRIST, AND THE HOLY GHOST AS MY WITNESSES.

Signed and dated this 4th day of November 2003 A.D.
Lawrence Rey Topham

Lawrence Rey Topham
Secretary of State and
Acting Governor of the
State of
Utah

BRIEF

The Right to Travel

 

U.S. COURT DECISIONS CONFIRM "DRIVING IS A RIGHT”

 

SPECIAL POLICE OFFICER BULLETIN U.S. COURT DECISIONS CONFIRM, "DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE" IS A CITIZENS RIGHT AND NOT A GOVERNMENT GRANTED PRIVILEGE.

 

For many years Professionals within the criminal justice System have acted upon the belief that traveling by motor vehicle upon the roadway was a privilege that was gained by a citizen only after approval by their respective state government in the form of the issuance of a permit or license to that Particular individual.  Legislators, police officers and court officials are becoming aware that there are now court decisions that prove the fallacy of the legal opinion that" driving is a privilege and therefore requires government approval, i.e. a license".  Some of these cases are:

 

Case # 1 - "Even the legislature has no power to deny to a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in accordance with the public interest and convenience.  - Chicago Motor Coach v Chicago, 169 NE 22 ("Regulated" here means traffic safety enforcement, stop lights, signs, etc.  NOT a privilege that requires permission i.e.- licensing, mandatory insurance, vehicle registration, etc.)

 

Case # 2 -   "The right of the citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city may prohibit or permit at will, but a common right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."- Thompson v Smith, 154 SE 579.

 

Case #3 - It could not be stated more conclusively that Citizens of the states have a right to travel, without approval or restriction (license), and that this right is protected under the U.S.  Constitution.  Here are other court decisions that expound the same facts:

 

  "The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the 5th Amendment." - Kent v Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125.

 

Case # 4 - "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the l4th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution." - Schactman v Dulles, 96 App D.C. 287,  293.

 

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT As hard as it is for those of us in Law enforcement to believe, there is no room for speculation in these court decisions.  The American citizen does indeed have the inalienable right to use the roadways unrestricted in any manner as long as they are not damaging or violating property or rights of another.

 

Government, in requiring the people to file for "drivers licenses, vehicle registrations, mandatory insurance, and demanding they stop for vehicle inspections, DUI/DWI roadblocks etc. without question, are "restricting", and therefore violating, the Peoples common law right to travel.

 

Is this a new legal interpretation on this subject of the right to travel?  Apparently not.  The American Citizens and Lawmen Association in conjunction with The U.S. Federal Law Research Center are presently involved in studies in several areas involving questions on constitutional law.  One of the many areas under review is the area of "Citizens right to travel." In an interview a spokesmen stated: "Upon researching this subject over many months, substantial case law has presented itself that completely substantiates the position that the "right to travel unrestricted upon the nations highways" is and has always been a fundamental right of every Citizen."

 

This means that the "beliefs and opinions" our state legislators, the courts, and those of as involved in the law enforcement profession have acted upon for years have been in error.  Researchers armed with actual facts state that U.S. case law is overwhelming in determining that - to restrict, in any fashion, the movement of the individual American in the free exercise of their right to travel upon the roadways, (excluding "commerce" which the state Legislatures are correct in regulating), is a serious breach of those freedoms secured by the U.S.  Constitution, and most state Constitutions, i.e. - it is Unlawful.

 

THE REVELATION THAT THE AMERICAN CITIZEN HAS ALWAYS HAD THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO TRAVEL RAISES PROFOUND QUESTIONS TO THOSE WHO ARE INVOLVED IN MAKING AND ENFORCING STATE LAWS.

 

The first of such questions may very well be - If the States have been enforcing laws that are unconstitutional on their face, it would seem that there must be some way that a state can legally put restrictions, such as - licensing requirements, mandatory insurance, vehicle registration, vehicle inspections, D.W.I. roadblocks, to name just a few, on a Citizens constitutionally protected right.  Is that not so?

 

For the answer to this question let us look, once again, to the U.S. courts for a determination on this very issue.

 

The case of Hertado v. California, 110 U.S. 516  states very plainly:  "The State cannot diminish rights of the people."

 

"the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice."- Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S.  22,  24.

 

Would we not say that these judicial decisions are straight to the point - that there is no lawful method for government to put restrictions or limitations on rights belonging to the people?

 

Other cases are even more straight forward:

 

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."  - Miranda v.  Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491.

 

“The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.” - Miller v. U.S., 230 F 2d 486, 489.

 

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of Constitutional rights."- Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.  945.  (There is no question that a citation/ticket issued by a police officer, for no drivers license, no current vehicle registration, no vehicle insurance etc. which carries a fine or jail time, is a penalty or sanction, and is indeed "converting a Right into a crime".)

 

We could go on, quoting court decision after court decision, however, In addition, the Constitution itself answers our question- "Can a government legally put restrictions on the rights of the American people at anytime, for any reason"?  (Such as in this particular case - when the government believes it to be for the safety and welfare of the people).

 

The answer is found in ARTICLE SIX of the U.S.  Constitution:

 

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not withstanding".  (This tells us that the U.S.  Constitution is to be upheld over any state, county, or city laws that are in opposition to it.)

 

In the same Article it goes on to say just who it is within our governments that are bound by this Supreme Law:

 

"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution;"  - ART.  6, U.S. CONST.

 

We know that Police officers, are a part of the Executive branch.  We are "Executive Officers".

 

Article 6 above, is called the SUPREMACY CLAUSE, and it clearly states that, under every circumstance, the above listed officials in these United States must hold this documents tenets supreme over any other laws, regulations, or orders.  Every U. S.  Police officer knows that they have sworn an oath to the people of our nation that we will not only protect their lives and property, but, that we will uphold, and protect their freedoms and rights under the Supreme laws of this nation, - the U.  S.  Constitution.

 

In this regard then, we must agree that those within government that restrict a Citizens rights, (such as restricting the peoples right to travel,) are acting in violation of his or her oath of office and are actually committing a crime against such Citizens.  Here's an interesting question.  Is ignorance of these laws an excuse for such acts by officials?

 

If we are to follow the "letter of the law (as we are sworn to do), this places officials that involve themselves in such unlawful acts in a unfavorable legal situation.  For it is a felony and federal crime to violate, or deprive citizens of their Constitutionally protected rights.

 

Our system of law dictates the fact that there are only two ways to legally remove a right belonging to the people.  These are - #1 - by lawfully amending the constitution, or #2 - by a person knowingly waiving a particular right.

 

Some of the confusion in our present system has arisen because many millions of people have waived their right to travel "unrestricted" upon the roadways of the states and opted into the jurisdiction of the state for various reasons.  Those who have knowingly given up these rights are now legally regulated by state law, the proper courts, and "sworn, constitutionally empowered officers-of-the-law," and must acquire proper permits, registrations, insurance, etc.

 

There are basically two groups of people in this category:

 

#1 - Any citizen that involves themselves in "commerce," (business for private gain), upon the highways of the state.

 

Here is what the courts have said about this:

 

"...For while a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain.  For the latter purpose no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion..." - State v Johnson, 243 P.  1073, 1078.

 

Other U.S. court cases that confirm and point out the difference between the "right" of the citizen to travel and a government "privilege" are - Barney v Board of Railroad Commissioners; State v City of Spokane, 186 P. 864; Ex Parte Dickey (Dickey v Davis), 85 S.E. 781; Teche Lines v Danforth, 12 So.2d 784.

 

There are numerous other court decisions that spell out the JURISDICTION issue in these two distinctly different activities.  However, because of space restrictions we will leave it up to officers to research it further for themselves.  (See last page for additional references).

 

#2 - The second group of citizens that are legally under the jurisdiction of the state is the individual citizen who has voluntarily and knowingly waived their right to travel "unregulated and unrestricted" by requesting placement under such jurisdiction through the acquisition of a state - drivers license, vehicle registration, mandatory insurance, etc.  (In other words, "by contract only".)

 

We should remember what makes this "legal," and not a violation of the individuals common law right to travel "unrestricted" is that they knowingly volunteer, freely, by contract, to waive their right.  If they were forced, coerced or unknowingly placed under the states powers, the courts have said it is a clear violation of their rights.

 

This in itself raises a very interesting question.  What percentage of the people in each state have filed, and received, licenses, registrations, insurance etc. after erroneously being advised by their government that it was mandatory?

 

Many of our courts, attorneys and police officials are just becoming informed about this important issue and the difference between "Privileges vs. Rights".  We can assume that the majority of those Americans carrying state licenses, vehicle registrations etc., have no knowledge of the rights they waived in obeying laws such as these that the U.S.  Constitution clearly states are unlawful, i.e.  "laws of no effect".  In other words - "LAWS THAT ARE NOT LAWS AT ALL."

 

OUR SWORN DUTY An area of serious consideration for every police officer, is to understand that the most important law in our land he has taken an oath to protect, defend, AND ENFORCE, is not state laws, nor city or county ordinances, but, that law that supersede all other laws in our nation, - the U.S.  Constitution.  If laws in a particular police officer's state, or local community are in conflict with the SUPREME LAW of our nation, there is no question that the officer's duty is to "uphold the U.S. Constitution."

 

What does this mean to the "patrol officer" who will be the only sworn "Executive Officer" on the scene, when knowledgeable Citizens raise serious objections over possession of insurance, driver’s licenses and other restrictions?  It definitely means these officers will be faced with a hard decision.  (Most certainly if that decision affects state, city or county revenues, such as the issuing of citations do.)

 

Example: If a state legislator, judge or a superior tells a police officer to proceed and enforce a contradictory, (illegal), state law rather than the Supreme Law of this country, what is that "sworn officer" to do?  Although we may not want to hear it, there is but one right answer, - "the officer is duty bound to uphold his oath of office" and obey the highest laws of the nation.  THIS IS OUR SWORN DUTY AND IT'S THE LAW!

 

Such a strong honest stand taken by a police officer, upholding his or her oath of office, takes moral strength of character.  It will, without question, "SEPARATE THE MEN FROM THE BOYS." Such honest and straight forward decisions on behalf of a government official have often caused pressure to be applied to force such officers to set aside, or compromise their morals or convictions.

 

As a solace for those brave souls in uniform that will stand up for law and justice, even when it's unpopular, or uncomfortable to do so...let me say this.  In any legal stand-off over a sworn official "violating" or "upholding" their oath of office, those that would side with the "violation" should inevitable lose.

 

Our Founding Fathers assured us, on many occasions, the following:

 

Defending our freedoms in the face of people that would for "expedients sake," or behind the guise, "for the safety and welfare of the masses," ignore peoples rights, would forever demand sacrifice and vigilance from those that desired to remain free.  That sounds a little like - "Freedom is not free!"

 

Every police officer should keep the following U.S. court ruling,  that was covered earlier, in mind before issuing citations in regard to "mandatory licensing, registration and insurance" - verses - "the right of the people to travel unencumbered":

 

"THE CLAIM AND EXERCISE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT CANNOT BE CONVERTED INTO A CRIME." - Miller v U.S., 230 F 2d 486.  489.

 

And as we have seen, "traveling freely," going about ones daily activities, is the exercise of a most basic right.

The Forgotten Legal Maxim

 

The forgotten legal maxim is that free people have a right to travel on the roads, which are provided by their servants for that purpose, using ordinary transportation of the day. Licensing cannot be required of free people, because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of a right. The license can be required of people who use the highways for trade, commerce, or hire; that is, if they earn their living on the road, and if they use extraordinary machines on the roads. If you are not using the highways for profit, you cannot be required to have a license plate or registration.


 DEMAND FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

 

NOW, comes the Accused, appearing specially and not generally or voluntarily, but under threat of arrest if he failed to do so, with this "BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION," stating as follows:



ARGUMENT 

 

If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the public roads, it was Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Justice Tolman stated:

 

"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered, the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment."

Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133, 147.

 

The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in the ears of Citizens throughout the country today as the use of the public roads has been monopolized by the very entity which has been empowered to stand guard over our freedoms, i.e., that of state government.



RIGHTS

 

The "most sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke was personal liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:

 

"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to private property ... and is regarded as inalienable."

16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987

 

This concept is further amplified by the definition of personal liberty:

 

"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct."

II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329, p.1135

 

and further ...

"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of changing situations, of removing one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by due process of law."              Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed.,                            Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed.;  Blackstone's Commentary 134; Hare, Constitution__Pg. 777

 

Justice Tolman was concerned about the State prohibiting the Citizen from the "most sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement, the Right of moving one's self from place to place without threat of imprisonment, the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life.

When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control its creation by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its operation (charters). Corporations who use the roads in the course of business do not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a difference between a corporation and an individual. The United States Supreme Court has stated:

 

"...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination on the suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional Rights as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing there from, beyond the protection of his life, liberty, and property. His Rights are such as the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of law. He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.

 

"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that the State, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how those franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the production of corporate books and papers for that purpose."

Hale vs. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75

 

Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the State's admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engaged in business for profit.

 

"...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its police power (see police power, infra.), may absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the legislative power is confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of privilege."

Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

 

It will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in order to reach a lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right or "privilege." We will attempt to reach a sound conclusion as to what is a "Right to use the road" and what is a "privilege to use the road". Once reaching this determination, we shall then apply those positions to modern case decision.

 

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

 

and ...

"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime."

Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489

 

and ...

"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional Rights."

Snerer vs. Cullen, 481 F. 946

 

Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of travel and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business or pleasure.

 

"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived."

Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22;
Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934;
Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607;
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163

 

and ...

"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city can prohibit or permit at will, but a common Right which he has under the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579

 

So we can see that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the public highways by automobile and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived of his Liberty. So where does the misconception that the use of the public road is always and only a privilege come from?

 

"... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion."

State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073;
Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171;
Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256;
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516

 

Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business upon the highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.

 

"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain.                                      " Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;
             Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82

 

and ...

"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus."

State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864

 

What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so "radically and obviously" from one who uses the highway as a place of business? Who better to enlighten us than Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of Washington State? In State vs. City of Spokane, supra, the Court also noted a very "radical and obvious" difference, but went on to explain just what the difference is:

 

"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a common right to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."

 

and ...

"This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized by all the authorities."

State vs. City of Spokane, supra.

 

This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has been proclaimed by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state courts to the federal courts.

"the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and uses it for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus. The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."

Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781

 

and ...

"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business."

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.;
Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784

 

There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position. (See Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, 329 and corresponding Am. Jur. [2nd].)

 

"Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty -- is one of the fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution. ... It is one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of Justice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to private property ... and is regarded as inalienable."

16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sect.202, Pg. 987

 

As we can see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads is drawn upon the line of "using the road as a place of business" and the various state courts have held so. But what have the U.S. Courts held on this point?

 

"First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are public property, and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or condition as it sees fit."

Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251;
Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited;
Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592;
Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313

 

So what is a privilege to use the roads? By now it should be apparent even to the "learned" that an attempt to use the road as a place of business is a privilege. The distinction must be drawn between ...

1. Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads, which is our Right; and ...

2. Using the public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality of business, which is a privilege.

"[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in carrying on a commercial business."

Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294;
Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82;
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.

"When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as the preservation of the highways."

Thompson vs. Smith, supra.

"[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith."

Ibid.

"We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate ... the use of the highways for gain."

Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works, supra.

 

There should be considerable authority on a subject as important a this deprivation of the liberty of the individual "using the roads in the ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be noted that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority acknowledging the state's power to convert the individual's right to travel upon the public roads into a "privilege."

 

Therefore, it is concluded that the Citizen does have a "Right" to travel and transport his property upon the public highways and roads and the exercise of this Right is not a "privilege."

 

DEFINITIONS

 

In order to understand the correct application of the statute in question, we must first define the terms used in connection with this point of law. As will be shown, many terms used today do not, in their legal context, mean what we assume they mean, thus resulting in the misapplication of statutes in the instant case.

 

AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE

 

There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle. An automobile has been defined as:

 

"The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways."

American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200

 

While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts have stated:

 

"A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received."

International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120

 

The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the word `automobile.'"

City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232

 

The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:

 

"Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, or passengers and property.

"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.

 

Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for private purposes, while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used upon the highways for trade, commerce, or hire.

 

TRAVEL

 

The term "travel" is a significant term and is defined as:

"The term `travel' and `traveler' are usually construed in their broad and general sense ... so as to include all those who rightfully use the highways viatically (when being reimbursed for expenses) and who have occasion to pass over them for the purpose of business, convenience, or pleasure."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717

 

"Traveler -- One who passes from place to place, whether for pleasure, instruction, business, or health."

Locket vs. State, 47 Ala. 45;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309

 

"Travel -- To journey or to pass through or over; as a country district, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether on foot, or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile, carriage, ship, or aircraft; Make a journey."

Century Dictionary, Pg. 2034

 

Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to one who uses a conveyance to go from one place to another, and included all those who use the highways as a matter of Right.

 

Notice that in all these definitions, the phrase "for hire" never occurs. This term "travel" or "traveler" implies, by definition, one who uses the road as a means to move from one place to another.

Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and business for the purpose of travel and transportation is a traveler.

 

DRIVER

 

The term "driver" in contradistinction to "traveler," is defined as:

"Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle..."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 940

 

Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed" in conducting a vehicle. It should be self-evident that this individual could not be "travelling" on a journey, but is using the road as a place of business.

 

OPERATOR

 

Today we assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and a "driver" is an "operator." However, this is not the case.

 

"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms `operator' and `driver'; the `operator' of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of carrying passengers for hire; while the `driver' is the one who actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was possible for the same person to be both `operator' and `driver.'"

Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658

 

To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed that this was a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business of carrying passengers.

 

This definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road as a place of business, or in other words, a person engaged in the "privilege" of using the road for gain.

This definition, then, is a further clarification of the distinction mentioned earlier, and therefore:

1. Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads as a matter of Right meets the definition of a traveler.

2. Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets the definition of a driver or an operator or both.

 

TRAFFIC

 

Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle," "traveler," "driver," and "operator," the next term to define is "traffic":

 

"... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention of unnecessary duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen the life of the highways or reduce the cost of maintenance, the revenue derived by the state ... will also tend toward the public welfare by producing at the expense of those operating for private gain, some small part of the cost of repairing the wear ..."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co. vs. Schoenfeldt, 213 P. 26

 

Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising revenue by taxing the "privilege" to use the public roads "at the expense of those operating for gain."

 

In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with the unnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other words, "vehicles for hire." The word "traffic" is another word, which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business.

 

"Traffic -- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise, bills, money, or the like. The passing of goods and commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money ..."

Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3307

 

Here again, notice that this definition refers to one "conducting business." No mention is made of one who is traveling in his automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in the passing of a commodity or goods in exchange for money, i.e., vehicles for hire.

 

Furthermore, the word "traffic" and "travel" must have different meanings which the courts recognize. The difference is recognized in Ex Parte Dickey, supra:

 

"...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs, and hacks, when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic and travel and obstruct them."

The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction between the two. But, what was the distinction? We have already defined both terms, but to clear up any doubt:

 

"The word `traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and has reference to the business of transportation rather than to its primary meaning of interchange of commodities."

Allen vs. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18

 

Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined the word "traffic" (in either it’s primary or secondary sense) in reference to business, and not to mere travel! So it is clear that the term "traffic" is business related and therefore, it is a "privilege." The net result being that "traffic" is brought under the (police) power of the legislature. The term has no application to one who is not using the roads as a place of business.

 

LICENSE

 

It seems only proper to define the word "license," as the definition of this word will be extremely important in understanding the statutes as they are properly applied:

 

"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort."

People vs. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4

 

"Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent."

Western Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116, 118

 

In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state would have to take up the position that the exercise of a Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state could then regulate or prevent.

This position, however, would raise magnetudinous Constitutional questions, as this position would be diametrically opposed to fundamental Constitutional Law. (See "Conversion of a Right to a Crime," infra.)

In the instant case, the proper definition of a "license" is:

 

"a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the police power."

Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d 199, 203

 

This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of carrying on business on the streets.

Most people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the state for the purpose of raising revenue, yet there may well be more subtle reasons contemplated; for when one seeks permission from someone to do something he invokes the jurisdiction of the "licensor" which, in this case, is the state. In essence, the licensee may well be seeking to be regulated by the "licensor."

 

"A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation, with the fee to cover costs and expenses of supervision or regulation."

State vs. Jackson, 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480, 487

 

The fee is the price; the regulation or control of the licensee is the real aim of the legislation.

Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government, or are they nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every facet of our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted from crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead now busying themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all are properly endorsed by the state?

 

How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for our lawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for her "blender" or "mixer?" They all have motors on them and the state can always use the revenue.

 

POLICE POWER

 

The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain act, or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be paid for certain occupations. The power used in the instant case cannot, however, be the power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open to Constitutional objection. (See "taxing power," infra.)

 

Each law relating to the use of police power must ask three questions:

 

"1. Is there threatened danger?

"2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

"3. Is this regulation reasonable?

People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power"

 

When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some very important issues emerge.

 

First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using his automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life and business?

 

The answer is No! 

 

There is nothing inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully managed. Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as a horse and buggy.

It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly to guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal, December, 1905.)

 

"The automobile is not inherently dangerous."

Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876;
Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532

 

To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous, would be a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to due process. (See "Due Process," infra.) 

 

Next; does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right?

This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief, and need not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this Citizen does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by automobile in the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be concluded that this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right.

 

The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this regulation reasonable?"

 

The answer is No!

 

 It will be shown later in "Regulation," infra, that this licensing statute is oppressive and could be effectively administered by less oppressive means.

 

Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power, in accordance with the general principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by the inhibitions there imposed.

 

Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates to limit the field of the police power to the extent of preventing the enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects. (See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)

 

"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority."  Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887

 

"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution."  Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60; Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613

 

"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied prohibitions in the Constitutions."  Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60

 

"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language."     Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882

 

As it applies in the instant case, the language of the Fifth Amendment is clear:

 

"No person shall be ... deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property without due process of law."

 

As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established an absolute Right to travel.

 

In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to all entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and without due process of law.

 

DUE PROCESS

 

"The essential elements of due process of law are ... Notice and The Opportunity to defend."                       Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427

 

Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of his/her Right, let alone before signing the license (contract). Nor was the Citizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of his/her right to travel, by automobile, on the highways, in the ordinary course of life and business. This amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of Liberty.

 

"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty..."

Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31;
Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 118 US 356

 

and ...

"The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the Magna Carta."

Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)

 

The focal point of this question of police power and due process must balance upon the point of making the public highways a safe place for the public to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates actual damage, an action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The state could then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of his Right to use the public highways, for cause. This process would fulfill the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at the same time insuring that Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the state constitutions would be protected.

 

But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there is no cause for interference in the private affairs or actions of a Citizen.

One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of due process of law, is that of Daniel Webster in his Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which he declared that by due process is meant:

 

"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial."

See also State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020;
Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333

 

Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that:

"no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has had his day in court,"

 

by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where it is fairly administered. (12 Am.Jur. [1st] Const. Law, Sect. 573, Pg. 269)

 

Note:  This sounds like the process used to deprive one of the "privilege" of operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be kept in mind, however, that we are discussing the arbitrary deprivation of the Right to use the road that all citizens have "in common."

 

The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in the 1959 Washington Attorney General's opinion on a similar issue:

 

"The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is recognized..."

 

And...

"Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways, our legislature has required that motor vehicle operators be licensed (I.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this requirement is to insure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle operators will be competent and qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard or risk of harm, to which other users of the highways might otherwise be subject. But once having complied with this regulatory provision, by obtaining the required license, a motorist enjoys the privilege of traveling freely upon the highways..."

Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No. 88, Pg. 11

 

This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person using an automobile as a matter of right, must give up the Right and convert the Right into a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise of regulation. This statement is indicative of the insensitivity, even the ignorance, of the government to the limits placed upon governments by and through the several constitutions.

 

This legal theory may have been able to stand in 1959; however, as of 1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision in Miranda, even this weak defense of the state's actions must fall.

 

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491

 

Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the Citizen's Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right into a privilege. Furthermore, we have previously established that this "privilege" has been defined as applying only to those who are "conducting business in the streets" or "operating for-hire vehicles."

 

The legislature has attempted (by legislative fiat) to deprive the Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary course of life and business, without affording the Citizen the safeguard of "due process of law." This has been accomplished under supposed powers of regulation.

 

REGULATION

 

"In addition to the requirement that regulations governing the use of the highways must not be violative of constitutional guarantees, the prime essentials of such regulation are reasonableness, impartiality, and definiteness or certainty."

25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 260

 

and ...

"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by government sufferance of permission."

Davis vs. Massachusetts, 167 US 43;
Pachard vs. Banton, supra.

 

One can say for certain that these regulations are impartial since they are being applied to all, even though they are clearly beyond the limits of the legislative powers. However, we must consider whether such regulations are reasonable and non-violative of constitutional guarantees.

First, let us consider the reasonableness of this statute requiring all persons to be licensed (presuming that we are applying this statute to all persons using the public roads). In determining the reasonableness of the statute we need only ask two questions:

 

1. Does the statute accomplish its stated goal? 

 

The answer is No!

 

The attempted explanation for this regulation "to insure the safety of the public by insuring, as much as possible, that all are competent and qualified."

 

However, one can keep his license without retesting, from the time he/she is first licensed until the day he/she dies, without regard to the competency of the person, by merely renewing said license before it expires. It is therefore possible to completely skirt the goal of this attempted regulation, thus proving that this regulation does not accomplish its goal.

Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives the appearance of underwriting the competence of the licensees, and could therefore be held liable for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees.

 

2. Is the statute reasonable?

 

The answer is No!

 

This statute cannot be determined to be reasonable since it requires to the Citizen to give up his or her natural Right to travel unrestricted in order to accept the privilege. The purported goal of this statute could be met by much less oppressive regulations, i.e., competency tests and certificates of competency before using an automobile upon the public roads. (This is exactly the situation in the aviation sector.)

 

3. But isn't this what we have now?

 

The answer is No!

 

 The real purpose of this license is much more insidious. When one signs the license, he/she gives up his/her Constitutional Right to travel in order to accept and exercise a privilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract, the Citizen has to give the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for constructive crimes and quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done and no damaged property.

 

These prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of their Constitutional Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by jury of twelve persons and the Right to counsel, as well as the normal safeguards such as proof of intent and a corpus dilecti and a grand jury indictment. These unconstitutional prosecutions take place because the Citizen is exercising a privilege and has given his/her "implied consent" to legislative enactments designed to control interstate commerce, a regulatable enterprise under the police power of the state.

 

We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give up Constitutional guarantees of "Right" in order to exercise his state "privilege" to travel upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business.

 

SURRENDER OF RIGHTS

 

A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name of regulation.

 

"... the only limitations found restricting the right of the state to condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use ..."

Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619;
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.

 

If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right?

 

"To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land."

Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15

 

and ...

"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another."

Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389

 

Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise the privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police power, due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute which is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen of Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the state constitutions.



TAXING POWER

 

"Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would be immediately open to severe Constitutional objections. If it could be said that the state had the power to tax a Right, this would enable the state to destroy Rights guaranteed by the constitution through the use of oppressive taxation. The question herein, is one of the state taxing the Right to travel by the ordinary modes of the day, and whether this is a legislative object of the state taxation.

 

The views advanced herein are neither novel nor unsupported by authority. The question of taxing power of the states has been repeatedly considered by the Supreme Court. The Right of the state to impede or embarrass the Constitutional operation of the U.S. Government or the Rights which the Citizen holds under it, has been uniformly denied." McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316

 

The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given the power to destroy Rights through taxation, the framers of the Constitution wrote that document in vain.

 

"... It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through the state cannot sensibly affect any function of government or deprive a Citizen of any valuable Right. But if a state can tax ... a passenger of one dollar, it can tax him a thousand dollars."

Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall 35, 46

 

and ...

"If the Right of passing through a state by a Citizen of the United States is one guaranteed by the Constitution, it must be sacred from state taxation."

Ibid., Pg. 47

 

Therefore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms of state taxation and if this argument is used by the state as a defense of the enforcement of this statute, then this argument also must fail.

 

CONVERSION OF A RIGHT TO A CRIME

 

As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel and to transport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel (without first giving up the Right and converting that Right into a privilege) the Citizen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This amounts to converting the exercise of a Constitutional Right into a crime.

 

Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and Snerer vs. Cullen quotes from Pg. 5, and:

"The state cannot diminish Rights of the people."

Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516

 

and ...

"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

Miranda, supra.

 

Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the limitations of the constitution was to protect the rights of the people from intrusion, particularly by the forces of government.

So we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of using the public highways as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon its face.

Any person who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so exercises that Right, cannot be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet, this Freeman stands before this court today to answer charges for the "crime" of exercising his Right to Liberty.

 

As we have already shown, the term "drive" can only apply to those who are employed in the business of transportation for hire. It has been shown that freedom includes the Citizen's Right to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business without license or regulation by the police powers of the state.

 

CONCLUSION

 

It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and not the mere form.

 

"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by mere pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn duty -- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If, therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted to protect ... the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects or is a palpable invasion of Rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution."

Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661

 

and ...

"It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the Constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."

Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616

 

The courts are "duty bound" to recognize and stop the "stealthy encroachments" which have been made upon the Citizen's Right to travel and to use the roads to transport his property in the "ordinary course of life and business." (Hadfield, supra.)

Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause and without the "due process of law" guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment. (Kent, supra.)

 

The history of this "invasion" of the Citizen's Right to use the public highways shows clearly that the legislature simply found a heretofore untapped source of revenue, got greedy, and attempted to enforce a statute in an unconstitutional manner upon those free and natural individuals who have a Right to travel upon the highways. This was not attempted in an outright action, but in a slow, meticulous, calculated encroachment upon the Citizen's Right to travel.

 

This position must be accepted unless the prosecutor can show his authority for the position that the "use of the road in the ordinary course of life and business" is a privilege.

 

To rule in any other manner, without clear authority for an adverse ruling, will infringe upon fundamental and basic concepts of Constitutional law. This position that a Right cannot be regulated under any guise, must be accepted without concern for the monetary loss of the state.

 

"Disobedience or evasion of a Constitutional Mandate cannot be tolerated, even though such disobedience may, at least temporarily, promote in some respects the best interests of the public."

Slote vs. Examination, 112 ALR 660

 

and ...

"Economic necessity cannot justify a disregard of Constitutional guarantee."

Riley vs. Carter, 79 ALR 1018;
16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 81

 

and ...

"Constitutional Rights cannot be denied simply because of hostility to their assertions and exercise; vindication of conceded Constitutional Rights cannot be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny them than to afford them."

Watson vs. Memphis, 375 US 526

 

Therefore, the Court's decision in the instant case must be made without the issue of cost to the state being taken into consideration, as that issue is irrelevant. The state cannot lose money that it never had a right to demand from the "Sovereign People."

 

Finally, we come to the issue of "public policy." It could be argued that the "licensing scheme" of all persons is a matter of "public policy." However, if this argument is used, it too must fail, as:

 

"No public policy of a state can be allowed to override the positive guarantees of the U.S. Constitution."

16 Am.Jur. (2nd), Const. Law, Sect. 70

 

So even "public policy" cannot abrogate this Citizen's Right to travel and to use the public highways in the ordinary course of life and business.

Therefore, it must be concluded that:

 

"We have repeatedly held that the legislature may regulate the use of the highways for carrying on business for private gain and that such regulation is a valid exercise of the police power."

Northern Pacific R.R. Co., supra.

 

and ...

"The act in question is a valid regulation, and as such is binding upon all who use the highway for the purpose of private gain."            Ibid.

 

Any other construction of this statute would render it unconstitutional as applied to this Citizen or any Citizen. The Accused, therefore, moves this court to dismiss the charge against him, with prejudice.

 

February 23, 2005 A.D.

 

 

_____________________

Thomas B Ginter

Sovereign Citizen

State of Heaven

 

In addition:

Since no notice is given to people applying for driver's or other licenses that they have a perfect right to use the roads without any permission, and that they surrender valuable rights by taking on the regulation system of licensure, the state has committed a massive construction fraud. This occurs when any person is told that they must have a license in order to use the public roads and highways.

 

The license, being a legal contract under which the state is empowered with policing powers, is only valid when the licensee takes on the burdens of the contract and bargains away his or her rights knowingly, intentionally, and voluntarily.

 

Few know that the driver's license is a contract without which the police are powerless to regulate the people's actions or activities.

 

Few (if any) licensees intentionally surrender valuable rights. They are told that they must have the license. As we have seen, this is not the case.

No one in his or her right mind voluntarily surrenders complete liberty and accepts in its place a set of regulations.

 

"The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion."

Edmund Burke, (1784)  

 

February 23, 2005 A.D.

 

Thomas B. Ginter, Jr.                   Personally Subscribed before me. Thomas B. Ginter                                  Lawrence Rey Topham

Sovereign Citizen                                   Secretary of State

State of Heaven                                        [State of Utah]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

 

        The accused, Thomas B. Ginter, Jr., hereby certifies that he hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Demand, Brief and Memorandum of law to the prosecutor in the court room of the West Valley City Unofficial Municipal Justice Court located at:

 3350 South Constitution Boulevard (2700 West)

West Valley City, Utah 84119

 (801)963-3500

 

Date of Service: February 23, 2005 A.D.

 

Thomas B. Ginter, Jr.

Thomas B. Ginter, Jr.